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Abstract
This address asserts that in seeking to resolve the political dilemma of Northern Ireland, the
lesson of the U.S. Constitution is particularly relevant. The root of the political conflict in Northern
Ireland is that, unlike in America, no consensus exists as to fundamental constitutional principles
or the idea that the source of political authority is legitimately derived from the “consent of the
governed.” The author argues that there is little hope of accommodation between the unionist and
nationalist communities as long as the symbols of sovereignty and the structures of government
administration serve or express the partisan agenda of one side only, whether unionist or national-
ist. The principle of the consent of the governed, which is central to the U.S. Constitution, is the
golden thread which may guide Northern Ireland out of the labyrinth.
ADDRESS
GAINING THE CONSENT OF THE
GOVERNED: A PREREQUISITE TO
PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Dick Spring
In this distinguished legal forum, it is appropriate to recall
the words of Thomas Addis Emmet, a man whose name is illustri-
ous both in Irish history and in the annals of the New York Bar.
At the beginning of the last century, Emmet wrote to a friend in
Ireland: "America is not what you saw it, not even what your
sanguine mind could anticipate. It has shot up in strength and
prosperity beyond the most visionary calculation. It has great
destinies, and I have no doubt will ameliorate the condition of
man throughout the world."'
In retrospect, it seems inevitable that the United States, with
all its human and material resources, was destined to become a
great world power. Yet, in Emmet's day, there were many areas
of the globe that possessed greater resources and comparable
potential. Emmet's prophetic and confident words were written
when the United States was less than two generations old. I be-
lieve his prophecy came true, not because of some law of nature,
but rather because the United States was particularly fortunate
in two important respects. First, it had in its Constitution a
unique legal framework that all its diverse population could ac-
cept and revere as particularly their own. Second, the United
States was able to develop political institutions that translated
the high principles of the Constitution into reality for successive
* Mr. Spring, Teachta Ddla [Member of Parliament] and leader of the Irish Labor
Party, is Tdnaiste [Deputy Prime Minister] and Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ire-
land. He presented this Address at Fordham University School of Law on June 27,
1994.
1. DAVID N. DOYLE, IRELAND, IRISHMEN AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 226 (1981).
After serving four years in a British prison for his involvement in the Irish freedom
movement, Emmet (1764-1827) emigrated to the United States, where he became At-
torney General of the State of New York. See HELEN LANDRETH, THE PuRsurr OF ROBERT
EMMET 67-71 (1948) (discussing events leading up to Emmet's arrest in Ireland and his
subsequent imprisonment); DoE, supra, at 214 (stating that Emmet became New York
State Attorney General).
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waves of immigrants, providing a stable democratic climate in
which the country could prosper.
In this latter respect, the contribution of Irish immigrants to
the United States was particularly important. The miseries of
their own history made the Irish people uniquely qualified to
cherish the notion that it was "We the People" who ordained and
established the Constitution. They, more than most, knew the
true value of the principle that the power to rule was not be-
stowed by hereditary caste, or won by force, but derived simply
and solely from the consent of the governed.
The root of the tragic conflict in Northern Ireland is that no
such fundamental consensus exists.2 In Northern Ireland, two
sets of rights, of perceptions, even of vocabularies, confront each
other.3 Two communities, unionist4 and nationalist,5 regard
each other with suspicion and distrust. There is no consensus
on fundamental constitutional principles or the legitimate
source of political authority. The only area of agreement seems
to be the assumption that the politics of Northern Ireland must
inevitably be a "zero sum game" of winners and losers. The Brit-
ish connection and the goal of Irish unity are asserted or denied
as a critical end-game that will decide which community finally
occupies the role of loser. Not surprisingly, these deep divisions
mean that there are also no agreed political institutions that
might, over time, channel the political energies and talents of
both communities into a shared process of accommodation.
The consequences of this polarization are, quite literally, lethal.
The philosophy of "winner takes all" has made everyone a loser.
It would be facile and quite wrong to blame this problem on
some character flaw in the people living in Northern Ireland.
On the contrary, the attitudes of both communities are self-evi-
dently rooted in the wider and turbulent history of Anglo-Irish
2. See generally J. BOWYER BELL, THE IRISH TROUBLES (1993) (describing modem
conflict in Northern Ireland); T.W. MOODY, THE ULSTER QUESTION: 1603-1973 (1980)
(providing history of conflict).
3. See NEW IRELAND FORUM REPORT 19-22 (available from Government Publications
Sales Office, Sun Alliance House, Molesworth St., Dublin 2, Republic of Ireland) (May
2, 1984) (outlining Northern Ireland's two political identities, unionist, and national-
ist).
4. See id. at 20-22 (defining unionists as those wishing to maintain Northern Ire-
land's political union with Britain).
5. See id. at 19-20 (defining nationalists as those wishing to see Northern Ireland
join with Republic of Ireland to form united Ireland).
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relations. The unresolved issues of that relationship are being
played out as human tragedy on the narrow ground of Northern
Ireland. Consequently, the British and Irish governments must
assume a central responsibility in addressing and resolving this
problem.
The Irish government has made the search for a solution a
key element of the Joint Programme.6 We have acted resolutely
on this commitment since taking office. The problem persists,
not because of a lack of determination to resolve it, but because
of a genuine perplexity about how best to achieve that daunting
task.
We start from the premise that the Northern Irish conflict is
one of two sets of rights, and not one of right and wrong. Both
the nationalist and unionist identities are equally authentic and
sincerely held, and both are fully worthy of respect. Their rela-
tionship cannot be one of victor and vanquished, because that
would be morally wrong. It would also be futile. The unmistaka-
ble lesson of history is that neither the nationalists nor the
unionists will accept the role of the vanquished. Each has the
critical mass and the undoubted capacity to thwart the other,
whether in a Northern Ireland or all-Ireland framework.
There is little hope of accommodation between the two
communities for as long as the symbols of sovereignty and the
structures of government administration serve or express the
partisan agenda of one side only, whether unionist or national-
ist. The principle of the consent of the governed, so central to
the U.S. Constitution, is, I believe, the golden thread which may
guide us out of the labyrinth. Thus, in seeking to resolve the
political dilemma of Northern Ireland, the lesson of the U.S.
Constitution is particularly relevant.
The principle of consent is crucial to the Joint Declaration 7
6. See FIANNA FAIL & LABOUR PROGRAMME FOR A PARTNERSHIP GOVERNMENT 1993-
1997 20-21 (1993) (available from Government Publications Sales Office, Sun Alliance
House, Molesworth St., Dublin 2, Republic of Ireland) (document establishing joint
Fianna Fdil/Labour Party program for government listing ways in which Ireland's coali-
tion government will work for peace in Northern Ireland). The Fianna Fail and Labor
parties formed the present Irish government on January 12, 1993. JoeJoyce, Eire: La-
bour Joins Fianna Fail in Historic Coalition, GuA.DIAN, Jan. 13, 1993, at 9.
7. JoINrr DECLARATION BY AN TAOISEACH, MR. ALBERT REYNOLDS, T.D., & THE BRrr-
ISH PRIME MINISTER, THE RT. HON. JOHN MAJOR, M.P. (Dec. 15, 1993) (available from
Government Publications Sales Office, Sun Alliance House, Molesworth St., Dublin 2,
Republic of Ireland) [hereinafterJoirT DECLARATION].
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signed by the British and Irish govemments last December. In
it, the Irish government declares, in the plainest terms we could
find, that it would be wrong to impose a united Ireland in the
absence of the freely-given consent of the majority of the people
of Northern Ireland.' That pledge is underpinned by the unhes-
itating support of a great majority of those within the nationalist
tradition.
Consent, however, is a coin with two sides. The duty to seek
consent is owed not only by the nationalist tradition to the
unionist tradition, but also by the British government and the
unionists to the nationalists. Nationalists argue that their con-
sent in the governance of Northern Ireland was never sought.
Indeed, nationalist aspirations were deliberately ignored at the
creation of Northern Ireland and throughout most of Northern
Ireland's history. Northern nationalists have never lived under
institutions they could consider their own. It would be an act of
statesmanship and realism, as well as one of justice, for the
unionist leadership to acknowledge that, in this respect, North-
ern Ireland has failed to embrace the principle of consent.
Advancing the principle of consent requires creating a
framework of law and government that no single group "owns"l
and that honorably reflects the values and identity of all citizens.
This framework must also be neutral and equitable in its impact.
Such an arrangement can be respected by all.
Nationalists still wait in vain for a sign that unionism ac-
knowledges them as equal partners, rather than a suspect minor-
ity to be kept at a distance and under control. No matter what
framework we choose in Ireland, the idea that one tradition can
have things its own way, leaving the other side to "like it or lump
it," is effectively dead. It is high time that unionists and national-
istjoined hands to give it a formal funeral.
In the last round of Talks,9 the governments and political
8. Id. at 5.
9. The Talks were convened under the aegis of the British and Irish governments
to discuss the political future of Northern Ireland. Participants in the Talks were the
Irish and British Governments, and Northern Ireland's constitutional political parties
(i.e., those rejecting the use of violence as a means of advancing political goals). The
Talks were convened on a three strand basis to reflect the totality of relationships within
the islands of Britain and Ireland. Strand 1 focused on relationships within Northern
Ireland and involved the Northern Ireland political parties and the British Govern-
ment. Strand 2 dealt with relationships within the entire island of Ireland and involved
the Irish Government and the parties that took part in Strand 1. Strand 3 concentrated
19941
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parties aptly defined their objectives as "achieving a new begin-
ning for relationships.""0 In the interest of a better future for all,
the British and Irish governments are seeking ways to boldly
strike out for new arrangements, in which both unionist and na-
tionalist traditions can rediscover themselves, and each other.
One significant step forward has already been taken in the Joint
Declaration. That is, the Joint Declaration has acknowledged
the relevance of the core nationalist belief that the future of Ire-
land is for the Irish people to decide for themselves without any
outside impediment." It also acknowledges that, within this
framework, unionists have important rights as heirs to an au-
thentic Irish tradition and that these rights are entitled to re-
spect as such.12
TheJoint Declaration remains valid as a statement of princi-
ple by the two governments, irrespective of whether or not the
paramilitaries avail themselves of the unique opportunity it of-
fers them to drain the poison of violence from our island. The
widespread support for the Joint Declaration in both unionist
and nationalist communities is also a potential mandate pro-
vided that we can fairly and imaginatively build new structures
on its foundations. TheJoint Declaration is the latest stage in an
ever-developing framework of cooperation between the British
and Irish governments that is designed to meet the challenge of
ending conflict in Northern Ireland. There is now a more ma-
ture and more equal relationship between the two countries,
and they are cooperating more closely than ever. This fact alone
is a cause for hope.
The Northern Ireland problem is rooted in past Anglo-Irish
quarrels. On both sides, residue from past conflicts remains. Ev-
idence of this is found in our traditional doctrines which, on
on the relationship between the islands of Ireland and Britain and involved the govern-
ments of both countries. Strand 1 began on April 30, 1991. Interview with Dermot
Brangan, Press and Information Officer, Consulate General of Ireland, New York (Sept.
9, 1994).
10. Peter Brooke, Member of Parliament and Secretary of State for Northern Ire-
land, Announcement Before the British House of Commons (Mar. 26, 1991), in BRIT-
ISH INFORMAoION SERVICES PRESS RELEASE 12/91, Mar. 26, 1991, at 1.
11. SeeJoINT DECLARATION, supra note 7, at 1 ("The Declaration makes it clear that
it is for the people of Ireland, North and South, to achieve agreement without outside
impediment.").
12. See id. at 6 (pledging to seek out ways to eliminate elements in democratic life
and organization of Republic of Ireland that constitute real and substantial threat to
unionist way of life and ethos).
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both sides, assume a consensus in Northern Ireland in favor of
simplistic British or Irish options. Historically, neither side has
recognized that the lack of such a consensus is the central, ines-
capable, political reality in Northern Ireland.
In an attempt to redress this historic failure to recognize the
need for consent, the Irish government agreed in the Joint Dec-
laration that, "as part of a balanced constitutional accommoda-
tion, [it would] put forward and support proposals for change in
the Irish Constitution which would fully reflect the principle of
consent in Northern Ireland."13 Of course, the principle of con-
sent is already compatible with the Irish Constitution. There is,
however, an important distinction between something merely
being compatible with the Constitution and something being en-
shrined in the Constitution. In the latter case, consent becomes
a determining principle in itself and, as such, engenders its own
jurisprudence. Thus, the scope of the proposed change is signif-
icant.
Constitutional principles are rarely, if ever, written on a
blank page. People interpret them in light of both their histori-
cal experience and the prevailing political realities. In North-
ern Ireland, constitutional issues are notoriously used as a code
or symbol for the victory of the unionist agenda over the nation-
alist, or vice-versa. For that reason, as well as for equity, the no-
tion of balance is crucial. The changes we make must not serve
to encourage the delusion of victory or defeat on either side.
Instead, they must reassure both sides to the maximum extent
possible.
In unionist eyes, Irish nationalism and the notion of Irish
unity is bound up with fears of coercion and the extinguishing of
their rights and identity. The campaign of violence against
unionists by nationalist paramilitaries has powerfully reinforced
these atavistic fears, which I accept as very real, although I be-
lieve that they are unfounded. Nationalists, on the other hand,
believe unionists are interested only in dominating them. They
see the unionist denial of nationalists' wider Irish allegiance as
being all of a piece with the Stormont government's denial of
nationalist rights. 4 Nationalists believe that no advance in terms
13. Id. at 7.
14. SeeJonN DARBY, CoNFLicr IN NORTHERN IRELAND 49 (1976) (describing compo-
sition and powers of parliament and government of Northern Ireland that convened at
1994]
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of equal rights was ever volunteered by unionism from within.
Sadly, there are elements on the unionist side to convince them,
whether through the rhetoric of hate or the obscenity of sectar-
ian murder, that unionism is unreformable and synonymous
with a hatred- of-nationalism. Therefore, nationalists fear that
every empowerment of unionism in a Northern Ireland context
must result in pressure on nationalists to revert to the role of a
subordinate minority, and they are adamant that they will never
do so again.
These are the fears that we must lay to rest by vigorously and
impartially advancing the principle of consent. We must recog-
nize that, at present, there is no political framework, either
within Northern Ireland or within Ireland as a whole, that can
command general support, across both Irish traditions. A
change of political status for Northern Ireland that merely in-
verts or relocates the problem of political consent is not a solu-
tion.
Because unionists and nationalists must live together on the
basis of equality and mutual respect, constitutional and institu-
tional change must not vindicate one community at the expense
of the other. We must find ways in which the absence of consen-
sus can be managed in a framework that acknowledges the
worth, integrity, and rights of both allegiances. We must ac-
knowledge diversity as a value rather than a threat, and we must
develop political structures accordingly.
At present, the British and Irish governments are discussing
how to chart a path to change that is acceptable to all as an hon-
orable accommodation. Of course, agreement between the two
governments does not guarantee agreement between unionists
and nationalists in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, nothing on
which the two governments fundamentally disagree can possibly
constitute an accommodation. That is an important reason for
pressing ahead within the framework of the Joint Declaration.
We will use all of our resources to persuade both communities in
Northern Ireland to accept new arrangements that are honora-
ble in terms of the past, just and fair in terms of the present, and
Stormont Castle). Nationalists strongly believed that Stormont legislation and policy
discriminated against them. See id at 54-58 (detailing inequities and perceived inequi-
ties in Stormont policies). The Northern Ireland Constitution Act, abolishing the
Stormont parliament, became law on July 18, 1973. Id. at xvii.
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equally open, in terms of the future, to whatever political model
commands consent across the entire spectrum of the Irish peo-
ple. Through these arrangements, we will seek to encourage co-
operation and mutual respect in accordance with the pledge
given by the two governments in the Joint Declaration to work
for such agreement.
We all know that violent death can come in Northern Ire-
land like a thief in the night. The savage cycle of paramilitary
violence on both sides is the ultimate denial of the consent and
the rights of the communities victimized. The violence is so
manifestly counter-productive in terms of both the nationalist
goal of Irish unity and the unionist goal of union with Britain
that it seems improbable that even the perpetrators of the vio-
lence can believe that it will advance either of these goals.
The most fervent wish of Irish people of both unionist and
nationalist traditions is that violence should cease. The Joint
Declaration offers a political alternative for all parties, including
the paramilitaries. The task of reconciliation will not be accom-
plished overnight or by magic while people sleep. It will require
persistent effort, courage, and risk taking on all sides. Building
consensus is harder work than destruction. The British and Irish
governments can do only so much; at some point, the coopera-
tion of both communities in Northern Ireland is indispensable.
Unionists and nationalists alike must acknowledge that, whatever
the political context, their future cannot be shaped in isolation
from one another. An Irish framework will not dissolve the de-
sire of the unionist community to relate to the wider British fam-
ily any more than a British framework has extinguished the de-
sire of Northern Irish nationalists for a relationship with the
wider Irish family. We must help both sides to come to terms
with that reality.
We have seen in South Africa and in the Middle East that
resolute political leadership can transform even the most intrac-
table conflicts. There should be no refusal to engage in dia-
logue, even across the deepest political chasms. I believe there is
a tide of opinion in Ireland running in favor of the politics of
accommodation and magnanimity. This offers an unprece-
dented opportunity for political leadership on all sides, and for
the unionist community in particular. In view of the tragic costs
of failure to date, there is both a moral and a political imperative
1994]
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to seize to the fullest extent this opportunity to provide leader-
ship.
My personal dream is that unionists and nationalists will one
day end their unnecessary and outdated conflict. Why should
not each community, instead, promote to the other the riches of
its own heritage? Each could make available for the common
benefit, the economic, social, or cultural advantages of the wider
Irish or British worlds to which it relates. Instead of denial,
there could be mutual acceptance and enrichment, with both
unionists and nationalists acting as forces for understanding and
cooperation between the peoples of the two islands. The precise
shape of an agreed Ireland could be decided in a contest of ben-
efits rather than one of fears. If we can realize that vision
through political dialogue, and win the support of those in the
United States who have the welfare of Ireland at heart, we can, in
the noble words of the U.S. Constitution, "promote the general
Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity."1 5
15. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
